The historic city of Hamedan is the capital of the central-western province of Hamedan in Iran. Once home to ancient philosophers and physicians, today the city of just under 600,000 is a center for tourism and agriculture, struggling to deal with a growing issue of water scarcity.^1,2 Like many cities in Iran, Hamedan’s water challenges are rooted in infrastructural mismanagement, poor policy planning, and the modern realities of climate change. Wastewater recycling for agricultural production is one way for the city to rethink its relationship with water and lower the burden on urban users.

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Hydrological Systems

Hamedan is located in an arid/semi-arid region of western Iran and relies heavily on groundwater. The city sits on the Hamedan-Bahar aquifer, which supplies 88% of the water consumed in the city and is recharged by snow melt, rainfall, and occasional flooding.^3,4 The water in Hamedan flows south to north, from the higher Alvand Mountains down toward the flatter plains. Although several rivers flow through and around the province, they tend to be seasonal and dry up in the summer months, especially with recent deforestation weakening soil absorption rates.⁵ As a result, Hamedan faces limited access to surface water during its long dry season (May through October). 

Existing Water Infrastructure

To manage and treat its water, Hamedan has two drinking water treatment plants (the Shahid Beheshti WTP and the Ekbatan WTP) that draw from nearby dams (the Ekteban Dam and the Abshineh Dam). The city also has a wastewater treatment plant that treats all of the city’s wastewater. The plant produces non-potable water that can be reused for industrial and agricultural purposes; today, most of the recycled water is used by the Shahid Mofateh Thermal Power Plant, in accordance with regulations from the Ministry of Energy. As of 2020, only phase one of the wastewater plant is in operation, with three still under construction, which will increase the plant’s capacity.⁶

Wells are also commonly used in Hamedan. They vary in depth but may be as deep as 100 meters and are largely used for gardening and irrigation purposes, though some are also used for drinking water.⁷ As of 2019, the Hamedan Regional Water Company has sealed 3,850 illegal wells across the province, out of a total of approximately 7,300.⁸

Water Governance and Political Landscape

Water in Iran is considered public property and the responsibility of the government, in particular the Ministry of Energy (MOE). Though the Ministry of Agriculture allocates water to farmers and collects fees, it is the MOE that is responsible for water and sanitation via a deputy minister. Water infrastructure projects are also planned, managed, and financed by the MOE.⁹

Within the MOE is the National Water and Wastewater Engineering Company, which assists and oversees 11 regional water boards and water and wastewater companies (WWC). Every province has two water and wastewater companies: one for rural regions and one for urban regions. The Hamedan Provincial Water and Wastewater Company – a state-owned public entity – is responsible for drinking water distribution, irrigation development and operations, wastewater collection, and collecting fees for services.¹⁰ Stormwater – perhaps due to the arid climate and limited precipitation – is not formally managed.

The top-down structure of government in Iran means that provincial water and wastewater companies have little involvement in the construction of water infrastructure and are solely responsible for treatment and distribution.¹¹ Rates are also set nationally by the National Economic Council and the Ministry of Energy, with some regional differentiation based on socioeconomic levels. This leaves the provincial company with limited financial and technical capacity and control. 

At the global level, geopolitical tensions between the central government and western states have significantly influenced Iran’s management of water resources. Since its 1979 Revolution, economic sanctions have limited Iran’s access to resources and technology. These sanctions have made Iran’s economy heavily reliant on resource production, particularly natural gas and crude oil, to an environmentally detrimental level.¹² Additionally, in an effort to be self-reliant for food production, the government has prioritized agricultural growth over sustainable water management practices.¹³ Today, agriculture accounts for nearly 13% of Iran’s GDP, 23% of its labor force, and consumes 92% of its water, compared to the global average of 70%.^14,15

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Water Challenges

The aforementioned environmental, political, and economic context has created severe water scarcity in Hamedan. Environmental factors and deforestation drive Hamedan’s physical water scarcity, while federal policies are responsible for managerial and institutional water scarcity locally and countrywide.

• Climate: The region’s arid climate means surface water is in short supply, and climate change has only exacerbated this reality with longer periods of drought. Low and decreasing precipitation has resulted in a heavy reliance on groundwater in the region as well as slowing aquifer recharge rates.¹⁶
• Deforestation: Deforestation in the Alvand Mountains to the south of Hamedan has reduced the soil’s ability to absorb water, further contributing to slowing aquifer recharge rates.¹⁷
• Water infrastructure mismanagement: For decades, the federal government focused on profitable dam projects, but given the limited and decreasing surface water supply, these projects have not provided a reliable alternative to groundwater.¹⁸ Mismanagement has left other projects like a water transfer pipe from Kurdistan to Hamedan and the expansion of Hamedan’s wastewater treatment plant delayed for years, once again forcing households and farmers to rely almost entirely on groundwater.¹⁹
• Food self-sufficiency above all else: Beginning in the 1980s, international sanctions spurred Iran to pursue a national strategy of food self-sufficiency.²⁰ As part of this strategy, the government provides large water and energy subsidies to farmers, leaving little incentive to adopt efficient irrigation methods – as does limited government oversight of well extraction.²¹ Today, the agricultural sector consumes 93% of freshwater in the province.²²

Hamedan’s urban and rural communities rely on an increasingly depleted aquifer for 88% of their water needs.²³ This overreliance on groundwater stems from limited surface water supplies and the central government’s failure to diversify the region’s water portfolio and incentivize efficient water consumption. Residents of Hamedan are already facing urban water shutoffs during the dry season and farmers must dig increasingly deeper wells as groundwater quality degrades.²⁴ There is broad agreement that the current rate of groundwater withdrawal is unsustainable.²⁵ While many factors contribute to groundwater depletion in and around Hamedan, Hamedan cannot achieve a sustainable future without addressing its largest freshwater consumer: the agricultural sector.

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Expanding Wastewater Recycling

Addressing the issue of water scarcity in Hamedan requires a significant reduction in agricultural groundwater withdrawal. Due to limited alternative sources – and the steep price of desalination and water transfer infrastructure – the most logical step forward for the provincial water authority is to expand the use of recycled water for agricultural practices and incentivize its use through a new water pricing scheme.

Benefits of water reuse include increased investment in agricultural technology, more accurate monitoring of water consumption, and prevention of further environmental damage, such as sinkholes and desertification. Non-potable wastewater can also act like fertilizer to improve nutrient levels in the soil and promote plant growth and produce a greater crop yield, which is essential for Iran’s food self-sufficiency policy.²⁶ 

Implementing the intervention also comes with its challenges. Expanding infrastructure to a necessary level to impactfully change the culture of withdrawal in Hamedan requires large capital investments in water metering and wastewater recycling infrastructure. With Iran’s history of project delays and underinvesting in water infrastructure maintenance, securing funding and expanding wastewater recycling infrastructure in any reasonable timeframe could be a challenge. Additional areas of concern include educating farmers on the benefits of reuse, expanding the technical capacity of the water authority’s staff, and timing pricing reforms so that farmers can transition into reuse comfortably and adapt their practices as needed. With these challenges in mind, this intervention proposes shifting agricultural water consumption in Hamedan away from groundwater and towards recycled wastewater in four phases:

1. Expand wastewater treatment infrastructure
2. Remove energy subsidies and implement a recycled wastewater pricing scheme
3. Build capacity to measure groundwater withdrawal
4. Implement a groundwater pricing scheme

Phase 1: Expand Wastewater Treatment Infrastructure

The first phase requires expanding the wastewater treatment infrastructure in Hamedan, ideally capitalizing on the planned expansion of the Hamedan wastewater treatment plant. Upon completion, the government expects the plant to be able to treat almost 60 million gallons per day.²⁷ This water source could be made available to farmers as an alternative to groundwater.

For the water to be reusable, it would likely require tertiary treatment to remove microbial or chemical contaminants. This means adding physical and chemical treatment processes to the current plant, as well as additional pipelines.²⁸ The practice of using wastewater and diluting it for agricultural practices is already commonly practiced by farmers in Iran, especially during dry months.²⁹ By introducing recycled water, the public health risks associated with unregulated use would be mitigated while providing farmers with a higher quality of water in drought periods.

With Iran’s history of project delays and underinvesting in water infrastructure maintenance, securing funding and expanding wastewater recycling infrastructure in any reasonable timeframe could be a challenge.  To secure funding, the federal government can work with the Islamic Development Bank to obtain a loan as it has done for previous wastewater projects in Hamedan.³⁰ Bringing an external partner could also help promote more accountability and transparency.

Phase 2: Remove Energy Subsidies and Implement a New Pricing Scheme

Once there is a greater supply of recycled wastewater, a new pricing strategy could incentivize farmers to use this water supply in place of groundwater. A major issue today is that groundwater is virtually free for any well owner aside from the energy cost of pumping.³¹ Well permits are easy to come by, there is little to no policing of illegal wells, groundwater withdrawal is neither measured nor restricted, and energy costs to pump water to the surface remain heavily subsidized.³² Since most rural water wells are not currently metered and a portion remain unlicensed, installing meters to monitor and charge for groundwater withdrawal will be a large undertaking.³³ A more immediate lever for increasing the cost of groundwater extraction is to remove energy subsidies for farmers with access to a supply of recycled wastewater. Recycled wastewater, on the other hand, could be priced at a low flat rate such that the price of this non-potable water would be less than the price of pumping groundwater.

One barrier to relying on recycled wastewater for agriculture is its limited availability. Recycled wastewater would draw from the wastewater produced by urban residents and industrial water users in Hamedan. However, these parties only account for 7% of local freshwater consumption.³⁴ As a result, recycled wastewater demand is likely to exceed supply under the new pricing scheme, so the regional water authority should consider allotting recycled wastewater to farms in proportion to their size. Though, even under this centralized allotment system, it is unrealistic to assume that farmers would be able to rely entirely on recycled wastewater without drastically downsizing the province’s agricultural sector. To meaningfully reduce agricultural water consumption, pricing interventions must eventually extend to groundwater usage.

Phase 3: Build Capacity to Measure Groundwater Withdrawal

In order to bill for groundwater, the regional water utility must have a way to measure its usage. The next phase in reducing unsustainable groundwater withdrawal is identifying a way to measure withdrawal by farms, which is most commonly done through groundwater metering. Installing meters on agricultural wells has been on the federal government’s agenda since 2014.³⁵ Despite interested in metering, however, the limited progress to date points to a need to reprioritize the effort.³⁶ Instead of attempting to roll out a national policy, approaching a groundwater metering system through a pilot in Hamedan could reduce the stakes from a political standpoint as well as some of the complexity. Many countries have attempted to implement groundwater metering, which provides a wealth of case studies from which Iran can learn. In New South Wales, Australia, for example, the government found that smart meters can drastically reduce the likelihood of tampering, though they require a power source.³⁷ Another option that some Indian states have explored is monitoring the electricity used in pumping groundwater as a proxy for metering abstraction.³⁸ 

The regional water authority is a key partner for this phase. In Iran, the federal government typicall secures funds for water infrastructure projects and oversees their construction. However, the regional water authority is likely better equipped to implement this effort due to their familiarity with local communities and the decentralized nature of installing and maintaining groundwater well meters in rural areas.³⁹ The regional water authority would also be responsible for ongoing operations and maintenance, which will be critical to long-term success. While enforcing abstraction limits, maintaining meters, and charging for groundwater will require new processes and hiring additional staff, user fees for groundwater withdrawal would provide a consistent revenue stream to cover these additional costs.

Phase 4: Implement Groundwater Pricing

Building the capability to monitor agricultural groundwater withdrawal will be time and capital-intensive, but unlocks the ability to charge farmers for their groundwater usage. Given the need to encourage more efficient water use among farmers, Hamedan should implement a tiered block rate structure for groundwater (Figure 1).

The lowest tier’s rate should be affordable, but still cost more than recycled wastewater. Since farms vary in size, the size of the lowest tier could scale with the size of the farm while factoring in a nationally set target water productivity rate. Water consumption in the country’s agricultural sector is only half as efficient as the global average, thus factoring a target rate of water productivity into the pricing structure is an important way to incentivize more efficient water use.⁴⁰ The EU estimated that Iran should reach a water productivity rate of 1.9 kilograms of crop production per cubic meter of water by 2020 to stay within the available water supply for agriculture, which the regional water authority could use to calculate the allotted water in the lowest tier for a given farm.⁴¹ The second tier should be two to three times more expensive than the lowest tier, and the third and final tier should approach the cost of urban drinking water. Under this new pricing scheme, water should remain affordable up to a certain water productivity rate, but farmers with inefficient irrigation methods should expect to see their cost of production increase.

TIER	VOLUME	RATE
Recycled Wastewater	Available supply allocated to farms within a certain radius of the treatment plant in proportion to farm size	$
Groundwater Tier 1	Calculated based on farm size & target water productivity rate of 1.9kg of crop yield per m3 of water	$$
Groundwater Tier 2	Calculated based on farm size	$$$$
Groundwater Tier 3	Calculated based on farm size	$$$$$$

Monitoring and paying for groundwater will be a major change for the agricultural sector. For decades, the federal government has subsidized water and energy costs for farmers in an effort to achieve food self-sufficiency.⁴² As a result, farmers have not been incentivized to invest in efficient irrigation methods or grow water-efficient crops.⁴³ Under the proposed pricing scheme, there will be limits to the amount of water farmers will be able to cheaply access. While this is by design – to encourage shifting towards more water-productive crops and irrigation methods – farmers are likely to protest the changes. There is also a risk that small farmers do not have the resources to adapt their irrigation methods. To avoid driving up unemployment in the agricultural sector, the Ministry of Energy should work with the Ministry of Jihad-e-Agriculture to develop programs that can provide financial and technical assistance to farmers to adapt their practices as they transition to the new pricing scheme.

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Hamedan Today and Tomorrow

In August of 2022, Hamedan’s Ekbatan Dam had to be shut down due to reservoir depletion. While a spokesperson for the Hamedan Provincial Water Company stated that a 44% drop in precipitation was the main reason for the reservoir’s lack of reserves, residents of Hamedan were left without water for up to 12 hours at a time, for over a week.⁴⁴ These shortages resulted in protests that reflected larger, national concerns over the central regime’s mismanagement of water sources. At the time, Hamedan was just one of 300 cities and thousands of villages suffering from a severe shortage of water.⁴⁵ 

The story of water scarcity in Hamedan is not one that is unique in the era of climate change, much less in the arid, nearly water-bankrupt region of the Middle East. Hamedan is one of many cities in need of new policies, governance, technology, and infrastructure to keep its water sources. In the face of recent political unrest across the country, demands for improved water management will only continue to echo louder until innovative, cost-effective, and environmentally-sustainable practices are put into place. Growing the use of recycled wastewater and raising the cost of groundwater for farmers, though not the perfect end-all, be-all solution to Hamedan’s problems, presents itself as a strong first step for the city. 

In addition to diversifying its water portfolio and sustaining an essential part of its economy, expanding wastewater recycling in Hamedan may create a platform for improved water management. The intervention could be leveraged to promote a national groundwater management agency to allocate water rights, improve cooperation between provinces, and more accurately monitor rates of consumption and discharge. Improving consumption from agriculture may also encourage the municipalities to impose urban conservation methods, especially given that municipal water rates do not incentivize conservative usage. Additionally, cooperating with the Ministry of Jihad-e-Agriculture and the Ministry of Cooperatives during the implementation of this plan will help introduce more efficient practices to farmers overall. Wastewater recycling in Hamedan should be treated as a stepping stone for an improved, holistic approach to water management. 

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Endnotes

1. Britannica. “Hamadan.” https://www.britannica.com/place/Hamadan. 
2. Tehran Times. August 2018. “Tourism in Hamedan is on the upswing.” https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/426727/Tourism-in-Hamedan-is-on-the-upswing. 
3. Akhavan, Samira & Mousavi, Sayed-Farhad & Mikayilov, Fariz. (2011). Conditioning DRASTIC model to simulate nitrate pollution case study: Hamadan–Bahar plain. Environmental Earth Sciences 63: 1155-1167. DOI 10.1007/s12665-010-0790-1. 
4. Jalali, Mohsen. 2006. Chemical characteristics of groundwater in parts of mountainous region, Alvand, Hamadan, Iran. Environ Geol 51: 433–446. DOI 10.1007/s00254-006-0338-6. 
5. Galeston, Mansoureh. August 2022. National Council of Resistance of Iran. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/economy/iran-the-origins-of-water-crisis-in-hamedan/ 
6. EghtesadOnline. “Hamedan Has a Functioning Wastewater Collection System.” January 2020.  https://www.en.eghtesadonline.com/Section-economy-4/31537-hamedan-has-functioning-wastewater-collection-system. 
7. Jalali, Mohsen. 2006. Chemical characteristics of groundwater in parts of mountainous region, Alvand, Hamadan, Iran. Environ Geol 51: 433–446. DOI 10.1007/s00254-006-0338-6. 
8. Financial Tribune. November 2019. “Hamedan Continues to Seal Illegal Water Wells.” https://financialtribune.com/articles/environment/100814/hamedan-continues-to-seal-illegal-water-wells. 
9. Tajrishy, M. 2010. Wastewater treatment and reuse in Iran: Situation analysis. Tehran: Department of Civil Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Environment and Water Research Center (EWRC). 
10. Tajrishy, M. 2010. Wastewater treatment and reuse in Iran: Situation analysis. Tehran: Department of Civil Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Environment and Water Research Center (EWRC). 
11. Tajrishy, M. 2010. Wastewater treatment and reuse in Iran: Situation analysis. Tehran: Department of Civil Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Environment and Water Research Center (EWRC). 
12. The World Bank. “Islamic Republic of Iran.” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/overview. 
13. Badawi, Tamer. “Iran’s Water Problem.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 11, 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77935/. 
14. World Bank. 2022. Iran Economic Monitor, Spring 2022 : Managing Economic Uncertainties – With a Special Focus : Preparing for an Uncertain Water Future. Iran Economic Monitor;. Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/37792.  
15. Adebahr, Cornelius and Olivia Lazard. “How the EU Can Help Iran Tackle Water Scarcity.” Carnegie Europe, July 07 2022.  https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/07/07/how-eu-can-help-iran-tackle-water-scarcity-pub-87281. 
16. Mahdavi, Golnaz. “Desertification in Iran: A Ticking Time Bomb?” IranWire, April 27, 2021. https://iranwire.com/en/features/69429/.; Behling, Robert, Sigrid Roessner, Saskia Foerester, Peyman Saemian, Mohammad J. Tourian, Tanja C. Portele, and Christof Lorenz. “Interrelations of Vegetation Growth and Water Scarcity in Iran Revealed by Satellite Time Series.” Scientific Reports 12, no. 20784 (December 1, 2022). https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-022-24712-6. 
17. Galestan, Mansoureh. “Iran: The Origins of Hamedan’s Water Crisis.” National Council of Resistance of Iran, August 30, 2022. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/economy/iran-the-origins-of-water-crisis-in-hamedan/.
18. Mahdavi, Golnaz. “Desertification in Iran: A Ticking Time Bomb?” IranWire, April 27, 2021. https://iranwire.com/en/features/69429/.
19. Dehkordi, “‘Crisis’ or Bankruptcy?: An Iranian City Enters Day Nine Without Water.”; OstanWire. “A Third City in Western Iran Reports Water Supply Cut-Offs.” IranWire, August 19, 2022. ; EghtesadOnline. (2020). Hamedan Has a Functioning Wastewater Collection System. https://www.en.eghtesadonline.com/Section-economy-4/31537-hamedan-has-functioning-wastewater-collection-system 
20. Badawi, Tamer. “Iran’s Water Problem.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 11, 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77935/.
21. Mesgaran, Mohsen B., and Pooya Azadi. “A National Adaptation Plan for Water Scarcity in Iran.” Stanford Iran 2040 Project, August 2018.
22. Keshavarz, Abbas, Shahram Ashraft, Nader Hydari, Morteza Pouran, and Ezzat-Allah Farzahneh. “Water Allocation and Pricing in Agriculture of Iran.” In Water Conservation, Reuse, and Recycling: Proceedings of an Iranian-American Workshop (2005), 153–72. Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 2005. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/11241/chapter/12.
23. Akhavan, Samira & Mousavi, Sayed-Farhad & Mikayilov, Fariz. (2011). Conditioning DRASTIC model to simulate nitrate pollution case study: Hamadan–Bahar plain. Environmental Earth Sciences 63: 1155-1167. DOI 10.1007/s12665-010-0790-1.
24. Farda, Radio. “Several Arrested In Western Iranian City During Water Protest.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, September 8, 2022. https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-hamedan-arrests-water-protest/32024554.html.; Jalali, Mohsen. (2006). Chemical characteristics of groundwater in parts of mountainous region, Alvand, Hamadan, Iran. Environ Geol 51: 433–446. DOI 10.1007/s00254-006-0338-6. 
25. Madani, Kaveh. “Explainer: Iran’s ‘Water Bankruptcy.’” The Iran Primer, December 5, 2021. https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/dec/05/explainer-irans-water-bankruptcy.
26. Solomon Ofori, Adéla Puškáčová, Iveta Růžičková, Jiří Wanner, Treated wastewater reuse for irrigation: Pros and cons, Science of The Total Environment, Volume 760, 2021, 144026, ISSN 0048-9697, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.144026. 
27. EghtesadOnline. “Hamedan Has a Functioning Wastewater Collection System.” January 2020.  https://www.en.eghtesadonline.com/Section-economy-4/31537-hamedan-has-functioning-wastewater-collection-system. 
28. Nikolaos Voulvoulis, Water reuse from a circular economy perspective and potential risks from an unregulated approach, Current Opinion in Environmental Science & Health, Volume 2, 2018, Pages 32-45, ISSN 2468-5844, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.coesh.2018.01.005.
29. Tajrishy, M. 2010. Wastewater treatment and reuse in Iran: Situation analysis. Tehran: Department of Civil Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Environment and Water Research Center (EWRC). 
30. Niayesh, Umid. “Islamic Development Bank to Allocate 144 Million Euros for Wastewater Projects in Iran.” Trend News Agency, February 21, 2014. https://en.trend.az/iran/2244620.html.
31. Michel, David. “Iran’s Environment: Greater Threat than Foreign Foes.” The Iran Primer, October 28, 2013. https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/oct/28/iran%E2%80%99s-environment-greater-threat-foreign-foes.
32. Nabavi, Ehsan. “Failed Policies, Falling Aquifers: Unpacking Groundwater in Iran.” Water Alternatives 11, no. 3 (2018). https://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/vol11/v11issue3/461-a11-3-14/file.
33. Nabavi, Ehsan. “Failed Policies, Falling Aquifers: Unpacking Groundwater in Iran.” Water Alternatives 11, no. 3 (2018). https://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/vol11/v11issue3/461-a11-3-14/file.
34. Keshavarz, Abbas, Shahram Ashraft, Nader Hydari, Morteza Pouran, and Ezzat-Allah Farzahneh. “Water Allocation and Pricing in Agriculture of Iran.” In Water Conservation, Reuse, and Recycling: Proceedings of an Iranian-American Workshop (2005), 153–72. Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 2005. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/11241/chapter/12.
35. Nabavi, Ehsan. “Failed Policies, Falling Aquifers: Unpacking Groundwater in Iran.” Water Alternatives 11, no. 3 (2018). https://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/vol11/v11issue3/461-a11-3-14/file.
36. Nabavi, Ehsan. “Failed Policies, Falling Aquifers: Unpacking Groundwater in Iran.” Water Alternatives 11, no. 3 (2018). https://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/vol11/v11issue3/461-a11-3-14/file.
37. Molle, Francois, and Alvar Closas. “Groundwater Metering: Revisiting a Ubiquitous ‘Best Practice.’” Hydrogeology Journal 29 (May 14, 2021). https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10040-021-02353-9. 
38. Molle, Francois, and Alvar Closas. “Groundwater Metering: Revisiting a Ubiquitous ‘Best Practice.’” Hydrogeology Journal 29 (May 14, 2021). https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10040-021-02353-9. 
39. Tajrishy, M. 2010. Wastewater treatment and reuse in Iran: Situation analysis. Tehran: Department of Civil Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Environment and Water Research Center (EWRC).
40. Financial Tribune. “Tehran Hosts Confab on Water Management,” December 18, 2017. https://financialtribune.com/articles/environment/78146/tehran-hosts-confab-on-water-management.
41. Keshavarz, Abbas, Shahram Ashraft, Nader Hydari, Morteza Pouran, and Ezzat-Allah Farzahneh. “Water Allocation and Pricing in Agriculture of Iran.” In Water Conservation, Reuse, and Recycling: Proceedings of an Iranian-American Workshop (2005), 153–72. Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 2005. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/11241/chapter/12.
42. Mesgaran, Mohsen B., and Pooya Azadi. “A National Adaptation Plan for Water Scarcity in Iran.” Stanford Iran 2040 Project, August 2018.
43. Behling et al., “Interrelations of Vegetation Growth and Water Scarcity in Iran Revealed by Satellite Time Series.”; Middle East Institute. “Harvesting Water and Harnessing Cooperation: Qanat Systems in the Middle East and Asia,” January 18, 2014. 
44. Maryan Dehkordi. August 2022. “‘Crisis’ or Bankruptcy?: An Iranian City Enters Day Nine Without Water.” https://iranwire.com/en/provinces/106971-crisis-or-bankruptcy-an-iranian-city-enters-day-nine-without-water/. 
45. Associated Press. “Iran’s water crisis is only getting worse.” August 2022. https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-iran-france-water-shortages-7bf6261e5b17f9228ceebaeaec5122f6